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REVIEWING THE HISTORICITY of flags in this country, and psychological as well as sociological and political the-ory, this article offers a critical reflection on the recent flag 
debate in Aotearoa New Zealand. As such, the article reflects the 
author’s interest in the psychotherapy of politics, which includes: 
‘a range of attempts to understand and to evaluate political life 
through the application of psychotherapeutic concepts’.1 This 
and other contributions to putting culture – and politics – on the 
couch2 not only aim to develop a political analysis that is more 
1  Nick Totton, Psychotherapy and Politics, London 2000, p. 6.
2  Andrew Samuels, Politics on the Couch, London 2001.
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psychologically- and psychotherapeutically-informed, but also to 
help people move from reaction and inaction through insight to 
social action.3
 The psychopolitics represented in this article draw not 
only on critical and radical traditions within western (and north-
ern hemisphere) psychotherapy, they are also informed by post-
colonial studies and indigenous perspectives on psychotherapy.4 
A key part of such studies is the questioning of western constructs 
such as ‘self’, ‘ego’, ‘object relations’, and so on.5 Even the use of 
the word and concept of ‘psyche’ (from the Greek word meaning 
breath, life, or soul) can be criticised for being somewhat indi-
vidualistic and certainly not grounded in this land and context. 
One of the peer reviewers of an earlier draft of this article sug-
gested that ‘life-worlds’ or ‘living knowledge system’ might be 
concepts that more readily lend themselves to a ‘psyche’ that is 
grounded in the kaupapa, tikanga and kawa of the marae. In re-
sponse, I wonder about the use of the word ‘iwi’, which, referring 
both to bones and tribe, carries the sense of a person-in-context: 
an individual (set of bones) who cannot be understood or con-
ceptualised outside their context, most immediately, their tribe. 
 
3  Sue Holland, Psychotherapy, Oppression and Social Action’, in Rosine Perelberg 
& Ann Miller, eds., Gender and Power in Families, London 1990, pp. 256-69. See, for 
instance, Keith Tudor and Helena Hargaden, The Couch and the Ballot Box, in Colin 
Feltham, ed., What’s the Good of Counselling and Psychotherapy?, London 2002, pp. 
156–78.
4  See Margaret Poutu Morice, Towards a Maori Psychotherapy. Unpublished 
Master’s dissertation, Auckland University of Technology, Auckland 2003. See also 
Wiremu Woodard, Entering the Void. Master’s dissertation, Auckland University 
of Technology, Auckland 2008. See also Joanne Reidy, What are the Meanings of 
the Mātauranga Māori Concept of Mana and What Might This Concept Contribute to the 
Understanding and Practice of Psychodynamic Psychotherapy? Master’s dissertation, Auck-
land University of Technology, Auckland 2016.
5  For a recent example of which see Keith Tudor, We are, Transactional Analysis 
Journal, 46/2 2016, pp. 164–76.
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Symbols and Signs
Central to this discussion is the relationship between flags as 
symbols and flags as signs. A symbol is an object that represents, 
stands for or suggests an idea, an image, a set of beliefs, an ac-
tion, or an entity. It is also a means of complex communication 
that has multiple levels of meaning which change over time, a 
point well illustrated in an article by Rachael Peltz in which she 
contrasts her father’s view of the symbolism of the American flag 
with that of her own.6 Semiotics, the study of symbols and signs, 
which derives from the work of Charles Pierce (1839–1914) and 
Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913), focuses on the relationship 
between the signifier and the signified. In this article, I draw on 
the work of Carl Gustav Jung, the Swiss analytic psychologist, 
who made the first systematic psychological study of symbols7, 
distinguishing a symbol, which he used to stand for something 
that is unknown and therefore cannot be made clear or precise, 
from a sign, which stands for something known. 
 In the recent New Zealand ‘flag debate’, it was possible to 
view the designs on the ‘long list’8 without accompanying expla-
nations, and thus as symbols. It was also possible, by clicking on 
each design, to read the designers’ explanations of their respec-
tive flags which, in Jungian terms, rendered each flag a sign.
 Flags are cultural symbols, and symbols of culture; na-
tional flags are symbols of nations. History may be written by 
the victors (a statement attributed to both Walter Benjamin and 
6  Rachael Peltz, My father’s flag, Fort Da, 10 2004, pp. 8-19.
7  Carl Gustav Jung, Symbols of transformation, in Gerhard Hull, ed., The Collected 
Works of C. G. Jung. Vol 2, Princeton NJ 1962; Carl Gustav Jung, Man and his sym-
bols. New York 1964. Carl Gustav Jung, Psychology and Alchemy, in Gerhard Hull, 
ed., The Collected Works of C. G. Jung. Vol. 12, Princeton 1968.
8  The long list was a list of 40 possible alternative flags which the Flag Considera-
tion Panel choose from 10,000 submitted designs; see New Zealand Government, The 
Long List, Wellington 2015, https://www.govt.nz/browse/engaging-with-government/
the-nz-flag-your-chance-to-decide/gallery/ .
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Winston Churchill), but traditionally it is the flag of the victors 
that is the first symbol to be raised over that of the vanquished. 
As Peltz put it: ‘The flag represents the place where we live at its 
best and worse’.9 Living fully – and preferably best – in the place 
we live concerns us all and is the purview not only of political and 
social science and philosophy but also of psychology and other 
‘psy’ sciences and disciplines (psychiatry, psychotherapy, coun-
selling psychology, etc.). In other words, in order to understand 
human relations, we need to draw on ideas about the psyche as 
well as society. 
Flags
Historically, the origin of national flags lies in military standards 
which were used as field signs to represent, organise and com-
municate between troops. In this context such standards or flags 
had – and still have – a representative function. The practice of 
flying a flag to indicate a country of origin dates back to the age 
of sail and the use of maritime flags. In this context such flags 
denoted identity and offered some protection to the ship, goods 
and crew sailing under the flag. Indeed, this was a major motiva-
tion for Māori to engage in the first New Zealand flag debate in 
the 1830s (see next section). It was only from the early 18th cen-
tury, with the emergence of greater nationalist sentiment, that 
national flags began to be designed and displayed in civilian con-
texts; indeed, only 20 countries in the world have flags predat-
ing the 18th century. During the 19th and early 20th centuries, 
most countries in Europe adopted a national flag, often based 
on medieval war standards; other countries in other continents 
tended to adopt or confirm a flag as they became independent. 
9  Peltz, My father’s flag, p. 12. 
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 While the original significance of such banners was 
a practical one – of organisation and protection – their princi-
ple psychological significance was – and is – one of identity. As 
such, flags are powerful symbols of nation and nationhood; and, 
for over 50 years, the study of history, symbolism and usages of 
flags, originally a branch or sub-discipline of heraldry, has war-
ranted its own term: vexillology. Whereas battle standards and 
flags on vessels were and are means of communication, a national 
flag, according to Raymond Firth, ‘performs a symbolic function’ 
because it is a ‘condensation symbol’ and ‘a focus for sentiment 
about society’.10 As Malcolm Mulholland puts it:
There can be little doubt about the purpose of a national flag, which 
is to invoke a deep sense of belonging that facilitates an emotional 
connection between the country it represents and the person who is 
affiliated to that country.11
That flags – civil, state, war or military, and ensigns (flags at 
sea) – are powerful symbols is evidenced by the amount of proto-
col concerning the definition, colours and display of flags, and, of 
course, the almost universal prohibition on burning the country’s 
national flag. Moreover, burning your enemy’s flag is the ulti-
mate protest against a country’s government, policies and even 
its people. 
Flags of Aotearoa New Zealand
The first flag of New Zealand – and, indeed, the first ‘flag de-
bate’ – has its origins in the early 19th century when inter-hapū 
gatherings were convened in part to deal with the European 
world, including a number of lawless Pākehā. From about 1808 
a new, additional form of united hapū authority came into be-
10  Raymond Firth, Symbols, Ithaca NY 1973, p. 365.
11  Malcolm Mulholland, New Zealand Flag Facts, accessed August 18 2016, https://
issuu.com/nzflagconsideration/docs/nz_flag_facts?e=23684794/33552205. 
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ing which was referred to as Te Whakaminenga o ngā Hapū o 
Nu Tireni (the General Assembly of the Tribal Nations of New 
Zealand) (hereafter ‘Te Whakaminenga’), an Assembly that still 
meets from time to time. These meetings were an opportunity for 
rangatira (chiefs) to exercise what Gray Theodore referred to as 
‘collective decision in communal governance’.12 The history of Te 
Whakaminenga is well-documented in Ngāpuhi Speaks13 which 
includes reports of local and regional relationships, including 
with hapū in the South Island, and discussions informed also by 
overseas travel and the establishment of international relation-
ships. According to one estimate, by 1840, 1,000 Ngāpuhi had 
travelled overseas to a total of 69 countries.14
 In their international trading, Māori ships were reported 
to display their own distinctive flag of woven flax;15 there were, 
however, problems with the recognition of Māori-owned ships in 
international waters, a problem that came to a head when, in 
November 1830 on her first voyage to Australia, the Sir George 
Murray was seized in Port Murray due to her lack of registration. 
Understandably, this seizure concerned the northern rangatira 
who responded by working with officials in Sydney, the mission-
ary Henry Williams and, later, the British Resident James Bus-
by (who arrived in 1833), to select an appropriate flag. In 1831 
two rangatira, Patuone and Taonui, who were part owners of the 
ship, went to Sydney to ask the authorities there to allow a flag 
12  Gray Theodore, Evidence of Gray Theodore, June 17 2010, Wai 1040 #4.1.2, 
Transcripts Week 2, Wai 1040 – Paparahi o te Raki Hearing, 14th–18th June, Te Tī 
Marae, Waitangi, Aotearoa New Zealand.
13  Susan Healy, Ingrid Huygens & Takawai Murphy, Ngāpuhi Speaks, Whangarei 
2012.
14  Nuki Aldridge, Supplementary presentation of evidence by Nuki Aldridge, Wai 
1040, Doc#B10(e), Waitangi Tribunal, Wellington 2010. 
15  Mereana Robinson, Mereana Robinson evidence, Wai 1040, Doc#4.1.3, Tran-
scripts Week 3, Wai 1040 – Paparahi o te Raki Hearing, June 14-18 2010, Te Tī 
Marae, Waitangi 2010.
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for the Māori.16 In his submission to the Paparahi o te Raki Hear-
ing, Patu Hohepa clarified the following:
They [the authorities in Sydney] were so impressed with what went 
on there they sent a flag for Māori. It had a Union Jack and the 
words on it. Wiremu [Henry Williams] looked at it and said “No, it’s 
not quite right” …. So they gave three examples of the flags they 
had thought. They sent to Sydney and they made them up, sewed 
them up, and brought them back.17
In his evidence to the same hearing, Manuka Henare clarified 
the details of and process about the design:
The red of the cross, the Ngāpuhi knew well the Anglican flag of 
St George, but not being satisfied with that, they demanded and 
insisted that the flag have a lot more red, red being the colour of 
mana of the rangatira …. So the cross of St George was expanded 
and a lot more red put on this flag.18
 Commenting on Henare’s account, Susan Healy, Ingrid 
Huygens and Takawai Murphy argued that ‘[it] shows that Wil-
liams worked on the design in consultation with Ngāpuhi’.19 Fi-
nally,
On the 20th March 1834 all the chiefs were gathered to make a deci-
sion as to which one was appropriate for them. Twenty five of them 
and their supporters … and the missionaries and those who lived 
here and those Europeans that lived among Māori all gathered 
here and they agreed [to] that, the flag we call “The Flag of the 
Whakaminenga o ngā Hapū o Aotearoa”.20 (see Figure 1)
 
16  Patu Hohepa, Patu Hohepa answers to questions, Wai 1040 #4.1.1, Transcripts 
Week 1, Wai 1040 – Paparahi o te Raki Hearing, May 14-18 2010 , Te Tī Marae, 
Waitangi 2010. .
17  Ibid., p. 127. 
18  Manuka Henare, Manuka Henare evidence, Wai 1040 Doc#4.1.2, Transcripts 
Week 2, Wai 1040 – Paparahi o te Raki Hearing, June 14-18 2010, Te Tī Marae, 
Waitangi 2010.
19  Healy, Huygens & Murphy, Ngāpuhi Speaks, 94 n420 (my emphasis).
20  Hohepa, Patu Hohepa answers to questions, p. 128.
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 While accounts of the history of this country’s first flag 
written by Claudia Orange, Michael King and Michael Wright 
begin and end with Busby21 and NZ History represents this as 
being a Pākehā initiative decided by a vote organised by the 
missionary Henry Williams,22 Ngāpuhi Speaks presents this 
clearly as a Māori initiative, decided in consultation. In any 
case, the flag was hoisted alongside the Union Jack and hon-
oured with a 21 gun salute; later gazetted in Sydney; and, as 
Orange noted, ‘the [British] Admiralty directed its navy ves-
sels to acknowledge the flag and respect the Maori registers’.23 
 Eighteen months later, and after some 27 years of 
wānanga/discussion, the Te Whakaminenga confederation of 
hapū declared their collective sovereignty in the document He 
Wakaputanga a te Rangatiratanga o Nu Tireni (The Declara-
tion of Independence) (hereafter ‘He Wakaputanga’). He Waka-
putanga declared the independence of Nu Tirene (New Zealand):
21  Michael King, The Penguin History of New Zealand, Auckland 2003; Claudia Or-
ange, The Treaty of Waitangi, Wellington 1987; Michael Wright. Independence daze, 
New Zealand Listener, June 26 2010, pp. 28-31.
22  The Declaration of Independence, NZ History, accessed June 29 2015, net.nz/
media/interactive/the-declaration-of-independence.
23  Orange, The Treaty of Waitangi, p. 20.
Figure 1. The flag of Te Whakaminenga o ngā Hapū o Nu Tirene (The United Tribes 
of New Zealand) (1834). Colours: blue, red, white. 
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which is hereby constituted to be an Independent State, under the 
designation of The United Tribes of New Zealand … [and that] All 
sovereign power and authority within the territories of the United 
Tribes of New Zealand is hereby declared to reside entirely and ex-
clusively in the hereditary chiefs and heads of tribes in their collec-
tive capacity.24
The fourth article of the Declaration thanked His Majesty, the 
King of England (William IV), for his acknowledgement of Te 
Whakaminenga flag (which they had sent to him a year earlier). 
By 1839, a further 18 chiefs had signed the Declaration. While 
Māori did not need validation from Busby, I suggest that it is 
significant that he himself viewed this Te Whakaminenga flag as 
a significant mark of Māori identity – but also, and most impor-
tantly for British colonial interests, that it would prevent other 
countries from making formal alliances with Māori.
 The tension represented in and between these two posi-
tions is important as it symbolises – and signifies – the beginning 
of two histories, or two interpretations of history, in and of this 
country. This became most apparent to me in reading the differ-
ent accounts of the history of the Confederation of the United 
Tribes of New Zealand as represented by mainstream accounts of 
New Zealand history and that of Te Whakaminenga in Ngāpuhi 
Speaks.25
 Within nine months of the signing of He Wakaputanga, 
a Royal Navy office, Captain William Hobson, visited New Zea-
land to investigate claims of lawlessness amongst the settlers. 
His report recommended that British sovereignty be established 
over New Zealand. Although historians differ as to the British 
24  The Declaration of Independence.  
25  Compare, for instance, Orange, The Treaty of Waitangi, and King, The Penguin 
History of New Zealand, with Margaret Mutu, The Humpty Dumpty principle at 
work, The Declaration of Independence, and He Whakaputanga o te Rangatiratanga 
o nga hapü o Nu Tïreni, in Sabine Fenton, ed., For Better or For Worse, New York 
2003, pp. 11-36.
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intentions regarding the form of governance, on 15 June 1839 
Letters Patent were issued by the British government to expand 
the territory of New South Wales to include the entire territory 
of New Zealand.26 A treaty was quickly drafted (in four days) 
by Hobson, his secretary James Freeman, and Busby, none of 
whom were lawyers; translated overnight into te reo Māori  by 
Williams and his son Edward Marsh Williams; and presented to 
a gathering of chiefs at Waitangi on 5 February 1840. Although 
Hobson had envisaged that more time would be needed for dis-
cussion, food was running out and some rangatira were prepar-
ing to leave, so, as 45 chiefs were ready or willing to sign the 
treaty, Hobson arranged for this to occur quickly, so much so that 
he signed it while still wearing his dressing gown! Three writ-
ten articles of Te Tiriti, which was originally signed on 6 Febru-
ary 1840, acknowledge Māori kāwanatanga (governorship), and 
tino rangatiratanga (sovereignty), as well as the importance of 
ōritetanga (equitable outcomes); and, an oral fourth article guar-
anteed wairuatanga (spiritual freedom). There were and, despite 
the principle of contra preferentum,27 still are differences of opin-
ion regarding the use of Te Tiriti (the original treaty that was 
signed by rangatira and Hobson and others) or The Treaty (the 
subsequent and mistranslated English language version). These 
differences have concerned the precise understanding that the 
original parties to Te Tiriti had of its articles and, most impor-
tantly, its intent; however, a recent judgement has confirmed 
that the rangatira who signed Te Tiriti did not cede sovereign-
ty.28 The fact that, through its representative, the British Crown 
26  Claudia Orange. The Story of a Treaty, Wellington 1989; Claudia Orange, An 
Illustrated History of the Treaty of Waitangi, Wellington 1990; Paul Moon, Te Ara Kī 
Te Tiriti, Auckland 2002.
27  The principle by which the indigenous language version of a treaty takes prece-
dence over that written in the language of the colonisers, a principle strengthened by 
the United Nations’ Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. New York 2007.
28  The Treaty of Waitangi, Waitangi Tribunal, accessed September 24 2015, http://
www.justice.govt.nz/tribunals/waitangi-tribunal/treaty-of-waitangi .
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was signatory to Te Tiriti gives Māori a particular relationship 
to the Crown and, given that Te Tiriti guarantees certain rights 
and responsibilities, Māori have looked to the Crown both to hon-
our Te Tiriti and to redress breaches of it. To date they have been 
sadly disappointed in both regards.
 Following the signing of Te Tiriti, the Union Jack re-
placed the flag of Te Whakaminenga (the United Tribes) as the 
official flag of New Zealand – or, rather, and significantly, Wil-
liam Hobson, then the new Lieutenant-Governor, removed the 
flag from the Bay of Islands and Port Nicholson (Wellington). 
Given Busby’s own acknowledgment of the significance of Te 
Whakaminenga, this can hardly be seen as anything other than 
a direct challenge to Māori tino rangatiratanga. The spirit and 
wording of Te Tiriti, at least in its indigenous version, would sug-
gest that these two flags had equal status, as had been acknowl-
edged a mere 11 months previously. In this context, Hobson’s ac-
tion in unilaterally replacing the flag of Te Whakaminenga with 
the Union Jack was an early breach of Te Tiriti by what was to 
prove to be an extremely perfidious Albion. This certainly was 
the view of Hōne Heke, the Ngāpuhi chief, who had supported 
and signed Te Tiriti, and who repeatedly felled his flagstaff at 
Kororāreka on which the Union Jack was repeatedly raised.
 In a discussion of Te Tiriti as the Māori Magna Carta, 
a series of events marking the 800th anniversary of its original 
signing,29 I heard a story from a Māori rangatira, which had been 
passed down through the generations, that Te Tiriti had been 
signed on a table covered by the Union Jack; in other words, it 
had been signed on the flag of the United Kingdom, the symbol-
ism of which had not been lost on his ancestor. Malcolm Mulhol-
29  Lisa Chant, (Chair), Isaac Hikaka, Simon O’Connor & Carrie Wainwright. The 
Māori Magna Carta – Waitangi and beyond. Discussion at Magna Carta 800 July 7 
2015, The University of Auckland, Auckland 2015.
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land also reports this version as one of his ‘flag facts’.30 While this 
appears unlikely from a practical point of view, as it is difficult 
to sign a document placed on cloth, the symbolism was – and is – 
real enough, as epitomised by Hobson’s subsequent actions.
 The current New Zealand flag was adopted in 1902 (with 
the passage of the New Zealand Ensign Act), at the end of the 
South African War (or Second Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902), to 
which the New Zealand government, eager to demonstrate its 
commitment to the British Empire, had sent a total of 6,500 men 
as well as a number of women who volunteered and served as 
nurses and teachers (the latter a group of 20 who were referred 
to as the ‘Learned Eleventh’). The design of the flag comprises 
a royal blue background which derives from the ensign of the 
blue squadron of the British Royal navy; in the first quarter, the 
Union Jack, which recognises New Zealand’s historical origins 
as a British colony and dominion; and on the right half, the four 
stars which symbolise the country’s location in the South Pa-
cific Ocean. Interestingly, this flag was disputed, including by 
the New Zealand Natives Association (NZNA), an organisation 
comprising second- and third-generation New Zealanders of Brit-
ish origin, whose own symbol was the silver fern leaf with the 
acronym NZNA on it. While the Southern Cross is a significant 
symbol of location – it appeared in 21 of the final ‘long list’ of 39 
designs for the alternative flag leading up to the first referendum 
– it is not specific to this land. Moreover, the combination of the 
Union Jack with (and over) the Southern Cross is a potent re-
minder of the extent of the British Empire and British influence 
in New Zealand, and that, although the Head of State is, by title, 
the Queen of New Zealand, she is more associated with Britain 
and being British – and, indeed, would not currently qualify for 
New Zealand citizenship!
30  Mulholland, New Zealand Flag Facts. 
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 The idea for a flag to reflect indigenous aspirations came 
from a trip that a group of Māori activists made to Australia in 
1982 to support Aboriginal opposition to the Commonwealth 
Games in Brisbane. Members of the Māori group were impressed 
by the prominent display of the Aboriginal flag (Figure 2). De-
signed in 1971 by Aboriginal artist Harold Thomas, who is de-
scended from the Luritja people of central Australia, the black 
field represents the Aboriginal people of Australia, the yellow 
circle the Sun, the giver of life and protector, and the red field the 
earth and Aboriginal people’s spiritual relation to the land. 
 In 1989, in anticipation of the sesquicentenary of the 
signing of Te Tiriti, the New Zealand government allocated 
funding to the commemoration. In response to this, Te Kawari-
ki, an organisation based in the Far North, came up with the 
idea of running a competition for a national Māori flag. Eventu-
ally Te Kawariki approached a collective of Māori women art-
ists and Linda Munn, Hiraina Marsden and Jan Dobson Smith 
came up with the winning design (Figure 3) which is referred to 
as the Tino Rangatiratanga flag. The black field represents Te 
Korekore, the realm of potential being, the long darkness from 
whence the world emerged, the heavens, and the male element. 
The koru, the curling frond shape, represents the unfolding of 
new life, rebirth and continuity, and offers the promise of renew-
al and hope for the future, in which the white colour represents 
Te Ao Marama, the realm of being and light, and the physical 
world, symbolising purity, harmony, enlightenment and balance. 
The red field represents Te Whai Ao, the realm of coming into 
being, active, flashing, southern, falling, emergence, earth, land, 
forest, and gestation, the female element and, specifically, Papa-
tuanuku, the Earth Mother, the sustainer of all living things.31
31  The National Māori Flag, NZ History, accessed June 29 2015, http://www.nzhis-
tory.net.nz/media/photo/national-maori-flag .
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Figure 2. The Australian Aboriginal flag (1971). Colours: black, yellow and red.
 
Figure 3. The Tino Rangatiratanga flag (1990). Colours: black, white and red.
 In January 2009, the Hon. Pita Sharples, then Minister 
of Māori Affairs, called for a Māori flag to be flown from Auckland 
Harbour Bridge on Waitangi Day. The Rt. Hon. John Key, as 
prime minister, responded by saying that he would support two 
flags flying if agreement could be reached on a preferred Māori 
flag. Following hui in July and August of that year at which four 
flags were considered – the New Zealand flag, the New Zealand 
Red Ensign (which is the same as the New Zealand flag, but with 
a red background), Te Whakaminenga (the United Tribes’) flag 
(Figure 1), and the Tino Rangatiratanga flag (Figure 3) – the 
Tino Rangatiratanga flag was chosen for the task. The choice 
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was subsequently recognised by Cabinet on 14 December 2009. 
The principles for flying this flag have since been published by 
the Ministry for Culture and Heritage.32 The New Zealand Red 
Ensign was chosen as the other flag to be flown. It has a par-
ticular history which bears upon that choice.33 Since the time of 
Governor George Grey (whose governorship was from 1845 to 
1853), this flag has been given to Māori upon the opening of a 
new marae, a practice which is enshrined in legislation under 
the Flags, Emblems, and Names Protection Act 1981. Accord-
ing to the Under-Secretary of the Department of Maori Affairs 
(1950), this is unique to Māori, a fact which represents another 
layer in the complex political relationship between Māori and the 
Crown.34
 The design and the symbolism of the Tino Rangatiratan-
ga flag marks a significant shift from those that represent and 
reflect an external (overseas) and imposed authority. Rather, it 
represents and reflects self-determination, and, thus, in effect, 
a movement from the monarchy to the people. Despite the rich-
ness of this symbolism, only three flags of the recent long list 
comprised only these three colours: one, ‘Black Jack’ by Mike 
Davison, which played with the symbol of the Union Jack by in-
corporating the koru; and two of Kyle Lockwood’s Silver Fern 
designs. With 17 of the 39 flag designs of the long list and two of 
the final four designs containing royal (as distinct from Pacific) 
blue, it’s as if neither designers nor the Flag Consideration Panel 
could let go of the symbolism of and association with the Brit-
ish monarchy. This is, however, complicated by the fact that, for 
32  The National Māori flag, Ministry of Culture and Heritage | Manatū Taonga, 
accessed September 29 2015,  http://www.mch.govt.nz/nz-identity-heritage/flags/
national-m%C4%81ori-flag .
33  See Flags of New Zealand, New Zealand History, accessed August 23 2016, http://
www.nzhistory.net.nz/politics/flags-of-new-zealand/other-official-flags.
34  Under-Secretary of Department of Maori Affairs, 6/12/1950, in IA1 Box 1839 
81/1, Part 2, National Archives of New Zealand, Wellington.
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many Māori in this country, the Union Jack represents the Brit-
ish Crown as a signatory on and to Te Tiriti; as Malcolm Mulhol-
land has pointed out, Māori have been debating their ‘allegiance’ 
to – or relationship with – the Crown since 1857.35
 Over the past few decades there have been numerous 
calls for a new flag to be adopted in New Zealand, and in Octo-
ber 2014, John Key, the recently re-elected prime minister, an-
nounced a two-stage referendum on the issue: the first to choose 
a preferred option from those selected by a cross-party parlia-
mentary committee; the second to decide between this preferred 
option and the current New Zealand flag.
 Neither the flag of Te Whakaminenga or the Tino Ran-
gatiratanga flag were put forward for consideration as the New 
Zealand national flag.  Malcolm Mulholland, a member of the 
Flag Consideration Panel has said that this was at the request of 
Māori:
As part of engaging with the community, the Flag Consideration 
Panel undertook a number of roadshow and hui throughout the 
country.  For the hui held at Waitangi, many of the speakers said 
that they did not want the United Tribes or Te Whakaminenga flag 
considered, as it was a symbol of their sovereignty and it did not 
belong to the country as a whole.
A similar response was garnered when we met with the whanau 
of Te Kawariki that included Hone and Hilda Harawira and the 
last surviving member of the three wahine who designed the flag, 
Linda Munn. The flag was designed to represent Maori and had 
gone through a process whereby it was agreed that the flag does 
represent Maori; a wish that those who participated in the hui at 
Whangarei expressed strongly.36
Clearly, it would be for Māori to decide whether either the flag 
of Te Whakaminenga or the Tino Rangatiratangi flag would ever 
35  Mulholland, New Zealand Flag Facts.
36  Malcolm Mulholland, personal communication, August 18 2016.
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be considered as the national emblem, but, if they did so, some, 
including the present author, would favour either of these as a 
symbol and a clear sign of our bicultural history, present, and 
future.37
 Before discussing the flag debate itself, I want to ac-
knowledge that there have been other Māori flags associated 
with places, such as the Gate Pā flag; movements, such as the 
Kīngitanga and Kotahitanga movements; and particular leaders 
such as Potatau te Wherowhero, the first Māori King; Te Kooti, 
the Ringatū leader and prophet (see Figure 4); and Rua Kenana, 
the spiritual heir to the Ringatū faith.38 Figure 4 shows a pen 
and ink drawing by Gilbert Mair of Te Kooti’s triangular pen-
nant Te Wepu (the Whip). This was originally made for Ngāti 
Kahungunu by nuns at the Greenmeadows Missionary School in 
Hawke’s Bay, and captured in 1868 by Te Kooti, who subsequent-
ly used it as his personal battle flag. Another version of this flag 
was captured in 1869 by government forces during the battle of 
Te Pōrere, near Tūrangi, and given to the colonial museum (the 
predecessor of the Museum of New Zealand Te Papa) in 1870.
 According to the online Encyclopedia of New Zealand, the 
symbols of Te Wepu represent the following: the crescent moon, 
a new world; the red cross, the fighting cross of the Archangel 
Michael; the mountain, New Zealand; and the bleeding heart, the 
suffering of the Māori people.39 Given that none of the symbols of 
these Māori flags, or of Te Whakaminenga, or the Tino Rangatira-
tanga flag, appear on the current New Zealand flag, or appeared 
37  See Chris Trotter, Why the tino rangatiratanga flag should be our national 
choice, accessed April 23 2016, http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/71655482/why-the-ti-
no-rangatiratanga-flag-should-be-our-national-choice.
38  For further details, see https://flagspot.net/flags/nz_maoh.html#pers. See also 
Wystan Curnow & Leigh Davis, eds., Te Tangi a te Matuhi, Auckland 1999. See also 
Mulholland, New Zealand Flag Facts.
39  Nick Tūpara, Te Kooti’s flag, in Te Ara – the Encyclopedia of New Zealand, ac-
cessed August 17 2016 http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/artwork/4228/te-kootis-flag .
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on any of the short-listed alternatives, this raises the question 
of whether a national flag can represent the ‘suffering’ of its peo-
ple or a reference to a conflicted or colonial past. In this sense, 
while a flag is a sign of what is known, it may also be a symbol 
of what is unknown, i.e., what is missing or has, in effect, been 
erased. This represents both a ‘gesture of exclusion’ and ‘grand 
erasure’, two ‘textual moves’, which Raewyn Connell  identifies 
as characteristic of the Northernness of what is presented as gen-
eral theory,40 and which, with regard to the flag debate, contrib-
utes to an understanding of how the debate was depoliticised. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Te Wepu (1860s)
The Flag Debate: Process, Psychology, and Politics
Debates about the current New Zealand flag are not new: Mal-
colm Mulholland dates these back to 1897.41 Criticism of the re-
cent New Zealand flag debate focused on a range of issues: its 
terms of reference; the structure of the two-part referendum; 
the composition of the Flag Consideration Panel, its processes 
and its choices (from 10,292 submissions to a long list of 40, to a 
40  Raewyn Connell, Southern Theory, Cambridge 2008.
41  Mulholland, New Zealand Flag Facts.
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short-list of four); the cost (estimated at $26 million); the process 
whereby a fifth flag (‘Red Peak’ by Aaron Dustin) was added to 
the final four (at a further cost of $380,000); and, at one stage, the 
prospect of a third pre-referendum about the form and wording of 
the two-part referendum!
 The principal arguments for change were: that the cur-
rent national flag does not adequately represent Aotearoa New 
Zealand’s current status as an independent sovereign nation; 
that it ignores Māori as tangata whenua; that it acknowledges 
only those New Zealanders of British heritage; and that it is too 
similar to the current Australian flag with which it is often con-
fused. These arguments support and are supported by a psychol-
ogy that embraces change; biculturalism and multi-ethnicity; 
and distinctiveness; in other words: independence with connec-
tion, the latter reflecting what Angyal (1941) described as the 
human trends to autonomy and homonomy or belonging.42
 The principal arguments for retaining the current flag 
were: that it represents the country’s history, and, specifically, 
its past and present links with the United Kingdom;43 and that 
generations of New Zealanders have fought and died under the 
current flag. These arguments support and are supported by a 
psychology concerned with continuity, familiarity, and conserva-
tism (in the literal meaning of the word).
 There are, of course, counter-arguments and rebuttals, 
not least, that when people refer to the ‘history’ of the nation, 
they are often referring to only part of this country’s history and 
that only since 1840; and that, as Rhys Jones, former chief of 
the New Zealand Defence Force, noted, the flag has already been 
42  Andreas Angyal, Foundations for a Science of Personality, New York 1941.
43  I find this particular argument both partial and somewhat ironic as I do not hear 
those people who make it, and especially those of British descent, being critical of 
the Union Jack for its lack of reference to Britain’s Celtic, Roman, Scandinavian or 
French heritage!
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changed during New Zealand’s recent history.44 There is also a 
certain ignorance about history, for instance, when ANZAC (Aus-
tralian and New Zealand) troops fought at Gallipoli in 1915, they 
did so under the Union Jack, not the Australian or New Zealand 
flags.
 In the end, the first referendum on the New Zealand flag, 
which took place in December 2015, asked the question: ‘If the 
New Zealand flag changes, which flag would you prefer?’ The 
turnout was 48.78% of those eligible to vote; the result, which 
was announced by the Electoral Commission on 15 December, 
was that the most preferred alternative flag design was the Sil-
ver Fern (the Black, White and Blue version), designed by Kyle 
Lockwood (Figure 5).
Figure 5. The preferred Silver Fern alternative flag (2015). Colours: black, royal blue, 
white and red.
 The second referendum, which took place in March this 
year, asked the question ‘What is your choice for the New Zealand 
flag?’ Based on an increased voter turnout of 67.8%, the result, 
which was announced by the Electoral Commission on 30 March, 
was: 43.2% in favour of the Silver Fern and 56.6% in favour of the 
current New Zealand flag.
44  Flag Consideration Panel, Flag Consideration Panel Answers the Six Top Ques-
tions, accessed September 27 2015, http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PO1506/S00066/
flag-consideration-panel-answers-the-six-top-questions.htm
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 The significance for this discussion of the runner-up lies 
with the sign-like qualities of the silver fern, which it depicts. 
The silver tree fern (cyathea dealbata) or kaponga is a species 
of medium-sized tree fern that is endemic to Aotearoa New Zea-
land; its leaves are dark green on the upper side and silver under-
neath. It is commonly associated with this country, most notably 
through the national rugby team, the All Blacks, whose official 
shirt (since 1903) has sported the silver fern. It is a quasi-na-
tional emblem: it was first worn by New Zealand troops in 1853, 
and is the symbol on New Zealand Commonwealth war graves; it 
appears in the coat of arms of New Zealand in which, since 1956, 
the compartment comprises two ferns (in green); together with 
the kiwi bird, four ferns adorn the reverse of the one dollar coin 
(introduced in 1991); and, since 2009 the silver fern has appeared 
on the cover of the New Zealand passport.45
 The stylised version of the silver fern was prime minister 
John Key’s preference for the new national flag, and it is perhaps 
no accident that three of the final four (or five) designs for the 
new flag comprised variations of the silver fern. These stylised 
versions, however, reflect more of a motif than a standard, more 
of a brand than a banner (as epitomised in Figure 6), and, indeed, 
given John Key’s personal support for the fern, a number of com-
mentators referred to the flag referendum as more about ‘Brand 
Key’.
 
 
 
Figure 6. Brand New Zealand. Colours: black and white.
45  For further discussion of the symbolism of the silver fern, see Mulholland, New 
Zealand Flag Facts.
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 In this sense, I suggest that the flag debate has been 
more about the logo of ‘brand New Zealand’, and not about the 
flag as an important and powerful symbol and/or sign that repre-
sents the political structure or aspirations of the country – which 
is still a constitutional monarchy.
The Flags and the Debate: Depoliticised and Regres-
sive
From a psychopolitical and a Left perspective, there were two 
problems with the New Zealand flag debate: it was depoliticised 
and, thereby, became a question of personal choice; and it was 
regressive, as a consequence of which, it has put back progressive 
discussion of the New Zealand constitution. 
It was personal, not political
There was very little discussion linking the flag to the present 
or possible future, let alone any counterfuture, constitution of 
the country. Indeed, politicians were at pains to depoliticise the 
debate. One commentator put this clearly: ‘the flag debate is only 
political in a peripheral sense…. It is primarily a cultural issue’.46 
This represented what Mathew Flinders and Matt Wood have 
referred to as ‘societal depoliticisation’, that is, a shift from the 
public to the private sphere. 47 In effect, this is a privatisation of 
what is or should be a public and political issue. I suggest that 
the concept of depoliticisation is a useful one with which to think 
about the flag debate as it refers to and describes a narrowing 
of the boundaries of democratic politics such that choice about, 
46  David Squire, NZ flag debate is a ‘Cultural Issue, Not Political’, accessed Septem-
ber 29 2015, http://www.stuff.co.nz/stuff-nation/assignments/what-should-be-on-nzs-
flag/11773355/NZ-flag-debate-is-cultural-issue-not-political.
47  Matthew Flinders & Matt Wood, Depoliticisation, governance and the state, 
Policy & Politics, 42/2 2014, pp. 135-149.
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agency in, and the outcome of issues of social/political concern 
are constrained and compromised – all of which occurred in the 
process of the debate.
 Taking Colin Hay’s conceptual work as a starting point,48 
Flinders and Wood mapped three forms of depoliticisation:
i. Governmental depoliticisation, which represents a shift 
from the governmental to the societal sphere – an example 
of which, with regard to the flag debate, was the establish-
ment and the work of the Flag Consideration Panel.
ii. Societal depoliticisation, as described above – an example 
of which was the efforts made by politicians not to make 
this a party political issue and, in effect, a personal, ‘con-
science vote’.
iii. Discursive depoliticisation, which represents a final shift 
from the private sphere to what Flinders and Wood refer to 
as the ‘realm of necessity’, that is, a kind of normalisation 
of political issues, such that they become or are perceived to 
be matters of necessity, nature or fate – examples of which 
with regard to the flag debate were the two lines of argu-
ment that as New Zealand is inevitably linked to its colo-
nial past, its flag should acknowledge that by retaining the 
Union Jack; and, conversely, that, as at some point in the 
future the country will have an elected head of state, its flag 
should reflect that sense of independence.
While the debate was ‘cultural’ in the broad sense of the word, 
often framed in terms of what it means to be Kiwi, it was not 
cultural in the sense of engaging with what it means to be a bi-
cultural nation and a multi-ethnic society and which flag – or 
flags – might best represent that. Of course, arguably, a bicul-
tural nation could – or should – have two flags. In this sense, the 
48  Colin Hay, Why We Hate Politics, London 2006.
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‘flag debate’ has reflected consumerism rather than citizenship, a 
contrast well examined by Klein in her book No Logo.49 In other 
words, while there has been a product (the different designs), and 
a method (the process determined by the government and held 
by the Flag Consideration Panel), there has been no methodology 
(i.e., any clarity regarding the philosophical or political assump-
tions underlying or informing the debate).
 In some ways, it was strange to see politicians arguing 
that this debate was not political. What they meant was that it 
was not – or, rather, that they did not want it to be – conducted 
along party political lines. This was entirely pragmatic as both 
proponents and opponents of the change of flag needed to garner 
votes from across the political spectrum. However, the fact that 
the debate was conducted within one electoral cycle meant that 
it was always more likely to be viewed and conducted along party 
political lines. Also, as John Key was so personally associated 
with one option, the vote also became a vehicle to express satis-
faction or dissatisfaction with him and, more broadly, with the 
National Party. Indeed, a number of commentators suggested 
that this was the driving factor in both the Labour Party and 
the Green Party opposing the referendum, which, from a princi-
pled, political perspective, they might have supported. Some sug-
gested that if the debate had been conducted over two electoral 
cycles, ‘it may have had better buy-in from parties of the left’,50 
but, perhaps more broadly, there would have been more chance 
of it involving genuine, political debate about what the – or a – 
national flag represents, and of entailing a debate about the con-
stitution.51 As a result, the debate became more about a plethora 
49  Naomi Klein, No Logo, Toronto 1999.
50  Audrey Young, Lessons to Learn From Flag Vote, New Zealand Herald, March 26 
2016. 
51  For an example of which, see Grant Robertson, New Zealand Flag referendums 
Bill – Third reading, [Speech], accessed April 21 2016, http://www.parliament.nz/en-
nz/pb/debates/debates/speeches/51HansS_20150813_00001140/robertson-grant-new-
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of personal motivations and preferences than about the politics, 
let alone the psychology, of what the flag symbolised and/or signi-
fied.
 There is, moreover, a more insidious aspect of these poli-
tics becoming personalised, and specifically on Key. Oliver Jutel 
has described Key’s function as being an agency of desire.As he 
puts it: ‘Key has served as a model of the good life while tran-
scending stagnant historical-political battle lines and offering 
a new nationalism of corporate spectacle and self-confidence’.52 
Key’s politics of enjoyment are seductive: they invite us to enjoy 
through him (for instance, his relationship with All Blacks cap-
tain, Ritchie McCaw),53 and to strive for this enjoyment in our 
own lives. Key is, Jutel wrote: ‘the agent of “yes, you can!”’ In this 
sense, the idea that we could choose our own destiny by the choice 
of a new flag debate represented a ‘libidinal investment’ in inde-
pendence – though, in reality, as this was not linked to any politi-
cal discussion about independence, it was a faux independence. 
It was regressive, not progressive
Some have suggested that the nature of the debate and the rela-
tive closeness of the result has created a momentum and that 
the factors driving change or the desire for change will only 
increase,54 including the debate about republicanism. Indeed, 
some republicans, notably Lewis Holden, supported the alterna-
tive flag. Others, however, including the present author, viewed 
the depoliticalised flag debate as a distraction, and the prospect 
zealand-flag-referendums-bill-%E2%80%94-third. 
52  Oliver Jutel, The political logic of desire, Overland, 223 2016.
53  Ritchie McCaw retired in 2015, following the All Blacks’ victory in the Rugby 
World Cup.
54  Lewis Holden, Opinion: The flag debate – it’s only just begun, New Zealand 
Herald, March 25 2016, accessed April 20 2016, http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/na-
tional/299907/this-flag-debate-has-only-just-begun .
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of an alternative flag as both regressive moves that take us fur-
ther away from a political debate. Such debate could occur as 
part of a general election or a referendum, about a political deci-
sion about the political constitution of the country.55 The Ameri-
can psychiatrist and family systems therapist Murray Bowen de-
veloped the concept of ‘societal regression’ to describe a gradual 
erosion of functioning at a societal level, evidenced by, amongst 
other things, emotionally-driven decisions that are inadequately 
supported.56 I suggest that the flag debate was an example of 
such regression, precisely because it was depoliticised, and, as 
a result, people’s individual decisions were based more on their 
emotional responses to the flag, the nation, the troops, Britain, 
John Key, politicians in general, feeling alienation, powerless, 
etc., than on a political analysis.
 The possible role of ‘societal regression’ is reflected in the 
criteria used by the Flag Consideration Panel when selecting its 
long list from the 10,000 submissions it received. According to 
John Burrows, the chair of the panel, in reviewing these submis-
sions, the panel was guided by the view that ‘a potential new flag 
should unmistakably be from New Zealand and celebrate us as 
a progressive, inclusive nation that is connected to its environ-
ment, and has a sense of its past and vision for its future’.57 What 
is striking is that none of these aspirational descriptors or quali-
ties were subject to any political analysis or discussion during 
55  He Whaakaro Here Whakaumu Mo Aotearoa, Matike Mai Aotearoa, accessed 
April 24 2016, http://www.converge.org.nz/pma/MatikeMaiAotearoaReport.pdf; 
Focusing on the Things That Matter, New Zealand Republic, accessed April 20 2016, 
http://www.republic.org.nz/latestblog/.
56  See Murray Bowen, Family Therapy in Clinical Practice, New York 1978; Patri-
cia A. Comella, Bowen’s concept of societal emotional process, New England Seminar 
on Bowen Theory, Conference on Emotional Process in Society, Wooster, April 2009; 
see also Keith Tudor, There ain’t no license that protects, Transactional Analysis 
Journal, 41 2011, pp. 154–61.
57  Quoted on http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/70996308/a-list-of-40-possible-
alternative-flags-chosen-from-10000; see also Mulholland, New Zealand Flag Facts.
109Tudor: Raising the Banner
the flag debate but, rather, were simply asserted and, thereby, 
remained personal. Several points can be drawn from this:
 – That Aotearoa New Zealand is a ‘progressive’ nation im-
plies that it is not a regressive or repressive one, or, pre-
sumably, a neo-liberal one.
 – For New Zealand to be an ‘inclusive’ nation would require 
a political discussion about Māori sovereignty, and of the 
limits to our inclusiveness, for example, in accepting immi-
grants who are ignorant or dismissive of Te Tiriti o Wait-
angi.
 – The claim that the nation is ‘connected to its environment’ 
is a particular – and particularly significant – way of ex-
pressing this relationship, as ‘the nation’ was imposed on 
this environment (land) and its indigenous people; and, as a 
concept, is at odds with the more personal relationship with 
land and place as, for example, is expressed in the word and 
concept turangawaewae.
 – That the nation has ‘a sense of its past’ implies that it has 
and/or we have an agreed view of the history of this coun-
try, and doesn’t acknowledge that history is disputed.
 – That the nation has ‘a vision of its future’ is, similarly, prob-
lematic, especially as no such vision was discussed during 
the flag debate.
Changing the flag without a discussion of the political system it 
represents, without reference to the land and people on which 
that system has been imposed, and without any real discussion 
about the nation’s past or future, would simply have been a form 
of window-dressing. From this perspective, having an alternative 
flag in the current constitutional context not only represents a 
reformist agenda, but also would have been a regressive move. 
I suspect that this was why many on the Left, both inside and 
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outside parliament, and some of the Māori Left, campaigned for 
the existing flag, despite its associations with colonisation and 
British tyranny.
The Point is to Change It
Karl Marx famously wrote, in his Eleven Theses on Feuerbach, 
that ‘The philosophers have only interpreted the world … the 
point is to change it’. While psychoanalysts have offered inter-
pretations to their patients or clients, including about their rela-
tionships with the world, traditionally, they have not themselves 
focused on changing the world. Moreover, the ‘psy’ professions, 
especially those in the Western tradition, are open to the accu-
sation that by focusing on insight and self-awareness, they are 
encouraging individuals to be(come) more individualistic. At the 
same time, from the early days of psychotherapy, there have 
been a number of Marxists, socialists and radicals committed to 
helping clients and changing the world. Perhaps not surprising-
ly, some practitioners in this tradition, who specifically identified 
as radical psychiatrists and radical therapists, 58 drew directly 
on Marx’s theory of alienation, expressing it in the following for-
mula: Alienation = Oppression + Mystification + Isolation. Such 
a formula enabled therapy to be viewed as a form of liberation, 
which could be expressed as: Liberation = Awareness + Contact 
+ Action.59 
58  See Paul Robertson, The Freudian Left: Wilhelm Reich, Geza Roheim and Herbert 
Marcuse, Ithaca 1990. See also Keith Tudor & Karen Begg, Radical therapy, The 
Journal of Critical Psychology, Counselling and Psychotherapy, 2016, pp 1–13.
59  The Radical Therapy Collective, The Radical Therapist, New York 1971; The 
Rough Times Staff, Rough Times, New York 1973; Claude Steiner, Hogie Wyckoff, 
Daniel Golstine, Peter Lariviere, Robert Schwebel, Joy Marcus, & Members of the 
Radical Psychiatry Center, Readings in Radical Psychiatry, New York 1975. Hogie 
Wyckoff, ed,  Love, Therapy and Politics, New York 1976; Beth Roy & Claude Steiner, 
eds., Radical Psychiatry: The Second Decade, Privately published manuscript 1988, 
available from Beth Roy, 270 Prospect Street, San Francisco, CA 94110.
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 In terms of the psychopolitics of this article, it is my con-
tention that, the flag debate was a depoliticised (at both govern-
mental and societal levels), alienated and alienating process. It 
was thus by virtue of three interconnecting dynamics:
i. That the power to make decisions about the selection of 
flags was placed in the hands of very few (a form of oppres-
sion).
ii. That the process was unclear, and complicated by the fact 
that, at the last minute, ‘the public’ appeared to have had 
some power to include a fifth design (a kind of mystifica-
tion).
iii. That the lack of a genuine political debate or mass action 
left people on their own (in isolation).
The point of this analysis, however, is not simply to offer some 
insight into psychopolitical dynamics and processes. It is to raise 
awareness of the point that people make contact with each other 
and with organisations such as the the Independent Working 
Group on Constitutional Transformation.60
Conclusion
Psychology, psychotherapy and the ‘psy’ disciplines are, among 
other things, concerned with meaning, and the meaning we make 
of meaning. Symbols are powerful objects that convey complex 
and multiple meanings. Given the significance of the national 
flag as both a symbol and a sign, it seems important to debate 
any proposed change to this in Aotearoa New Zealand with re-
gard to biculturalism; ideas of nation and nationhood; politics, 
including the constitution; as well as the psychosocial implica-
tions of all of these. The recent flag debate did not do any of this, 
60  Matike Mai Aotearoa, He Whaakaro Here Whakaumu Mo Aotearoa.
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settling instead for generalised and depoliticised assertions of 
what it means to be ‘Kiwi’, and with very little reference to iwi. If 
we can take anything from this expensive mistake, I would hope 
it would be that the next debate about the flag should be based 
on and in a political debate about the constitution of our coun-
try, based on relations between tangata whenua and non-Māori 
(Pākehā and tauiwi), which a new flag would then represent. In 
this way, both our history and our counterfuture might be writ-
ten by the participants.
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